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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
This memorandum surveys the requirements for appointment of an expert under
international law, as well as the law regarding examination of an in-house expert.* While
Cambodian courts utilize civil law, this memo examines the requirements of appointment of
expert witnesses and requirements of impartiality in both common law countries and civil law
countries. Also considered is the approach taken by previous international criminal tribunals
(particularly the ICTY and ICTR).
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The ECCC’s Rules of Evidence do not address the qualifications or
requirements for expert witnesses.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rule 31 governs expert
witnesses. While the rule states that the Co-Investigating Judges or Chambers can request
testimony from an expert witness, the rule is generally silent on any requirements for an
individual to qualify as an expert in the Chambers. However, Internal Rule 87 provides that the
Chambers has the ability to reject evidence that may be, among other factors, repetitive or
irrelevant. While the Chambers rejected expert testimony in one case, it seemed to act pursuant
to Internal Rule 87 rather than Internal Rule 31, removing the evidence because it was deemed
unnecessary. Because of the lack of guidance in the Chambers’ Internal Rules with regards to
requirements for expert witnesses, the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia provides that international law can be examined to determine how the
“What are the requirements for appointment of an expert under international criminal law?
What is the law regarding the examination of an in-house expert?” Topic refined pursuant to
contact with Prosecution’s Office to determine the admissibility of in-house expert testimony,
particularly with regards to the use of the Prosecution’s Office Staff as expert witnesses.
*
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Court should respond to such omissions by the Internal Rules. The evidentiary rules for the
ICTY and ICTR, however, do allow for challenges to expert testimony by parties involved in the
case, providing one set of rules in international law that can be looked to in determining how the
court should rule in Cambodia.
2. Globally, international law has found that judges can find evidence
inadmissible if the expert or the expert’s techniques do not satisfy the judge.
While rules greatly vary from country to country over the admissibility of expert witness
testimony, all countries allow for judges to exclude the testimony if it does not satisfy some
standard established by the court.
As a common law country, the United States provides the Daubert standard as the
seminal test in determining the admissibility of expert witness testimony. The Daubert standard,
which applies to all expert testimony, asks the court to examine factors such as whether the
methods employed could be tested, whether the research was peer reviewed, a consideration of
the known or potential rate of error, the existence of and maintenance of standards controlling
the technique’s operation, and whether there is general acceptance in the scientific community.
In Britain, another common law country, a more liberal approach is employed, requiring only
that expert testimony be given by “competent” individuals, although the British have required the
courts to examine the expert’s credentials.
When looking to common law countries (of which Cambodia is a member), France has
lists that can be utilized in selecting experts, and also recognizes particular rules governing the
admissibility of expert testimony (such as the inadmissibility of expert testimony made by a
minor or incompetent individual). The French courts will not allow minors or legally
incompetent individuals to testify as witnesses, and some professions require national standards
be met in order to testify before the courts. Korea generally requires that experts demonstrate
8

experience requisite to testifying about their expertise, and the typical expert witness possesses
scholarship or licensure in the field in which he is testifying. Italian law requires that experts be
impartial and be appointed by the court, while Japanese law allows the appointment of experts
from provided lists and based upon recommendations from various professional organizations.
The ICTR and ICTY have held that four factors govern the admissibility of expert
testimony: 1) Whether the subject matter is in itself proper for expert testimony, or if it is a
matter that is already within the “knowledge and experience of the court;” 2) whether the
evidence is relevant in assisting the Trial Chambers in determining the matter at hand; 3) if the
expert has the “necessary qualifications and methods;” and 4) whether the expert is independent.
3. While many nations have required impartiality from their expert
witnesses, the international criminal tribunals have not held that in-house
experts for the prosecution were biased based solely upon their relationship
with the prosecution.
The ICTR and ICTY have established that expert witnesses, upon taking an oath before
the court, must act as “servants of the court,” which requires an impartial and unbiased
testimony. One court has held that a witness, who was scheduled to be brought before the same
court for a matter related to the one on which he was to testify, could not qualify as a witness
because of the inevitable conflict and potential to infringe upon the witness’ rights. The Court
has also precluded testimony from an individual who worked at the Office of the Prosecutor and
assisted the prosecution in interview techniques. The court rejected this testimony on the
grounds that the witness was inextricably linked to the prosecution, however, it still allowed
factual testimony from that witness. The court has held on other occasions staff members of the
prosecution to be viable expert witnesses, likely because they were not as involved in the work
of the prosecution as that of the witness who assisted the prosecution in strategy.
The United States and England both state that the trier of fact should determine what
9

weight to give testimony that is potentially biased. However, both countries have allowed the
court to intervene in instances where an overt bias prejudiced one side of the case, establishing
what seems to be a very high threshold for judges to intervene in instances of obvious bias by an
expert. German and Korean law, however, allow much more leniency in allowing the recusal of
expert witnesses who are not impartial. These courts, which require the experts to act as agents
of the court and of the judges, implement a model most similar to that of the ECCC which also
provides for the Court’s appointment of expert witnesses. As such, the German and Korean
treatment of biased witnesses proves the most valuable for this analysis.
II. ECCC’S RULES OF EVIDENCE DO NOT ADDRESS THE QUALIFICATIONS OR
REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPERT WITNESSES
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (the Chambers, ECCC) are
governed in part by the Court’s Internal Rules.1 The Internal Rules, however, are not
comprehensive in addressing every question that may arise as to a matter of law. Because of
this, the establishing documents of the ECCC provide that “If these existing procedure [sic] do
not deal with a particular matter, or if there is uncertainty regarding their interpretation or
application or if there is a question regarding their consistency with international standard,
guidance may be sought in procedural rules established at the international level.”2

1

See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules, (revised Sept. 11,
2009), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/121/IRv4-EN.pdf.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
2

Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, (revised Oct.
27, 2009), Article 33, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4]. See also Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules, supra note 1, at Rule 2 (stating that Article 33 is one of the
articles that can govern in the event that an issue arises that is not codified within the Internal
Rules).
10

A. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rule 31
ECCC Rule 31 addresses the role of experts within the tribunal.3 An “expert” has been
defined as “[a] person who, through education or experience, has developed skill or knowledge
in a particular subject, so that he or she may form an opinion that will assist the fact finder.”4
Rule 31 provides that the Chambers or Co-Investigating Judges can appoint an expert to
complete a specific task, as well as details the process by which the experts conduct such
assignments.5 However, Rule 31 is silent as to the requirements that must be met in order for a
witness to qualify as an expert, stating only that “The Co-Prosecutors, the Charged Person or
Accused, the Civil Party, or their lawyers may request the Co-Investigating Judges or the
Chambers to appoint additional experts to conduct new examinations or to re-examine a matter
already the subject of an expert report.”6
B. ECCC Internal Rule 87
While the Chambers’ Internal Rules are silent towards specific requirements of experts,
Rule 87 provides some limiting rules with regards to admissible evidence. The Rule provides
that the Chamber “may reject a request for evidence where it finds that it is: irrelevant or
3

Id. at 28-29.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (8th ed. 2004). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
42]. See also Memorandum from Kimberly M. Miles to the Office of The Prosecutor for the
Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at 3-4 (2001) available at http://www.law.case.edu/WarCrimes-Research-Portal/memoranda/Kmiles.pdf (defining different forms of expert witnesses).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
4

5

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules, supra note 1, at 28-29.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
6

Id. at 29.
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repetitious, impossible to obtain within a reasonable time, unsuitable to prove the facts it
purports to prove, not allowed under law, or intended to prolong proceedings or is frivolous.”7
This rule, while not expressly referring to expert witnesses, would seem to apply to expert
testimony, as it would still deal with the admissibility of evidence before the Chambers, although
in the form of testimony by an expert.
C. Application of Internal Rules in Pre-Trial Chambers Decision
Despite the Internal Rules’ ambiguity towards the requirements of expert witnesses, the
Pre-Trial Chamber has rejected the testimony of an expert regarding the health of a detainee.8
The Chambers stated that, because the expert did not personally examine the health of the
detainee in question, the only information that could be provided by the expert would be the
general effect of prolonged detention on the human body.9 The Chambers pointed out that the
matter involved that of a “specific person and has to be treated as such,” requiring any testimony
related to such effects to be from experts who had personally examined the detainee.10 While the
testimony was excluded, the Chambers seemed to act pursuant to Internal Rules Rule 87 in
declaring the testimony as irrelevant and repetitive, rather than involving Rule 31’s expert
witness provisions, as Rule 87 prohibits evidence that is irrelevant or repetitious.
D. International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia Rules
Governing Expert Witnesses
7

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules, supra note 1, at 61.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
Prosecutor v. Sary, Decision on Ieng Sary’s Expedited Request for Dr. Paulus Falke to Give
Expert Evidence During the Oral Hearing on Provential Detention on 2 April 2009, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/278/C22_5_34_EN.pdf. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
8

9

Id. at 4.

10

Id.
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Rule 31 differs from those of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which allow for the opposing party
to challenge “the qualifications of the witness as an expert or the relevance of all or parts of the
statement and/or report ....”11 This is a marked difference, as the ECCC allows for additional
examination of the facts where the ICTR/ICTY provide for opposing parties to directly challenge
the qualifications of experts. Without this language, the only way within the Internal Rules of
the ECCC to prevent an expert witness from testifying is under the Rule 87 prohibitions, as there
is no mechanism within Rule 31 for parties to challenge an expert appointed by the Chambers.
III. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY
While the ECCC operates within the Cambodian court system, utilizing civil law
mechanisms, its statute allows examination of “international law” in settling issues not addressed
within the Internal Rules.12 Given this ambiguous allowance, an examination of both common
law nations and civil law nations is warranted to determine what, if any, standards have emerged
under customary international law governing expert testimony. Additionally, precedent set by
other international criminal tribunals, while governed by different rules and charters, can still
prove instructive on international standards involving the admissibility of expert witness
testimony.
11

International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, (amended July 24, 2009) at 97, available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_Rev43_en.pdf.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
12

See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, supra note
2 at Rule 33. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
13

A. Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony in Common Law Nations
This memo examines the admissibility of expert witnesses in two common law nations:
the United States and England.13
1. United States Law Regarding the Admissibility of Expert Testimony14
The United States’ law governing expert testimony is articulated by the United States
Supreme Court’s 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.15 The Supreme
Court in Daubert overturned the predominant test of the time: the Frye “general acceptance” test,
which required expert testimony to be excluded unless the techniques utilized by the expert were
“generally accepted” as reliable by other experts in that area.16 Citing the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which had been enacted by Congress in the years since Frye, the Court outlined a new
standard.17 Under the Daubert standard, the Court should consider several factors in determining
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 293 (8th ed. 2004) (describing “common law” as “The body of
law derived from judicial decisions, rather than from statutes or constitutions.” [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
13

14

This portion of the paper is structured similar to Kimberly M. Miles, supra note 4, at 14-18,
altered where appropriate to serve the purpose of analyzing the ECCC and its rules under the
context of the United States’ rules of admissibility of expert testimony. The insight provided by
the previous memo is greatly appreciated in light of the helpful research provided by the
previous memo’s author. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
15

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
16

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 7].
17

The Court found that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 spoke directly to the issue of expert
testimony, providing that “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.” The Court found that this new standard did not include the “general
acceptance” rule propagated by the Frye decision, thus rendering Frye superseded by the Federal
14

whether to admit expert testimony, including: Whether the methods employed could be tested,
whether the research was peer reviewed, a consideration of the known or potential rate of error,
the existence of and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation, and whether
there is general acceptance in the scientific community (utilizing the Frye “general acceptance”
test as one of the factors to be examined, but not conclusive in itself).18 Under this method, the
judge acts as a “gatekeeper” who is charged with allowing in scientific evidence, so long as it is
relevant as well as reliable.19
Daubert was further expanded by the Court’s decision in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael.20 While Daubert applied its new standard to “scientific” testimony, the Court
extended Daubert to apply to all expert testimony, as the Court recognized that Fed. R. Evidence
702 does not distinguish between “scientific” knowledge and “other specialized” knowledge.21
The Court further elaborated on the Daubert factors, explaining that the listed factors were
intended to be “helpful, not definitive.”22 The factors discussed in Daubert should be examined

Rules of Evidence.
18

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6]. The Court
also stated that Fed. R. Evidence 104(a) required the testimony to include “scientific knowledge
that [can] assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue,” essentially
reinforcing a relevancy standard for such testimony.
19

Gia E. Barboza & Lynn M. Goedecke, Can Federal Oversight of Forensic Science Reduce the
Incidence of Wrongful Convcitions?, 45 No. 5 CRIM. LAW BULL. Art. 7. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
20

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 10].
21

Id. at 147-49.

22

Id. at 151.
15

when “they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.”23 The Court in
Kumho made certain to stress this point, as the Daubert standard was intended to ensure that the
proffered expert testimony was relevant and reliable.24
The Daubert standard is very similar to the ECCC’s Internal Rule 87, which as discussed
before25 allows the exclusion of evidence that is “irrelevant or repetitious.” However, Rule 87
does not make any mention of a “reliable” standard for evidence. However, such a reliable
standard may be important in cases involving alleged bias, or a lack of impartiality on the part of
an expert witness. This issue is addressed in detail in section IV of the memo, detailing the
standards of international law with regard to impartiality and potential bias of expert witnesses.
While Daubert is similar to Internal Rule 87 with regard to exclusion of irrelevant expert
testimony, there is a striking difference in the contexts in which these experts make their
testimony. In the United States, while judges are able to appoint their own expert witnesses,
such occurrences have been considered “rare,” despite difficulties in quantifying such
appointments.26 Traditionally, such appointments are made by the litigants in U.S. cases,
whereas the expert witnesses in the ECCC are appointed by the judges, who request of the

Id. The goal, according to the Court, is “to make certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”
23

24

See Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout from Supreme
Court’s Decision in Kumho Tires, 14 CRIM. JUST. 12 (2000) (expressing how the judges may
approach these evaluations with different forms of testimony). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 37].
25

Supra, note 7 and accompanying text.

26

Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and
Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 78 (1998). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
16

experts certain information.27 This contextual difference greatly changes the policy reasons
behind the rules, as the ECCC judges are in a position to better control what witness testimony
comes before the court by appointing it from the outset. It is therefore unlikely that “irrelevant”
testimony would be brought before the judges, as well as lessening the likelihood that unreliable
testimony would make its way before the Chambers.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Evidence 702, a U.S. Court can allow the admission of a witness as
an expert based upon experience, rather than upon formal training.28 When considering the
admission of an expert based on such experience, the Court should consider the number of
experiences the expert has, the similarity of those experiences, and the resemblance of the
witness’ experiences to those in the instant case.29 These factors again seem to be stressing the
need for “reliability” on the part of the expert testimony.
2. English Common Law Regarding the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
With English common law, opinion evidence is inadmissible unless it meets one of three
exceptions, including an “expert-opinion evidence exception.”30 This exception allows the
admission of evidence of “proved matters of specialized knowledge, on which the court would
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be unable properly to reach a conclusion unaided.”31 The experts are limited in that they can
testify only as to the facts they actually perceived.32 These experts can work as assessors, courtappointed experts, or adversarial experts, only requiring that the Court deem the experts as
“competent.”33 While this standard is noticeably vague and seemingly liberal in application (as
“competency” is hard to define, and does not seem to set forth a high threshold for admittance),
the Court has been urged to investigate the expert witness’ “true credentials” before admitting
their testimony, as well as urged not to accept testimony “unquestioningly.”34 This requirement,
much like Daubert, seems to be focused on ensuring the reliability of expert testimony brought
before the English courts (albeit a less strenuous test in ensuring such reliability than that
imposed by Daubert and its progeny).
Under English common law, the tribunal of law determines the admissibility of expert
witness testimony, while the weight granted to admitted evidence is evaluated by the tribunal of
fact.35 The English courts are able to limit the expert testimony in some ways, such as
disallowing experts’ testimony when it deals with “common sense” or information within the
knowledge ordinary people.36 While limiting the testimony of these witnesses, English common
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law still provides a “much lower threshold for the admission of novel scientific evidence” than
the United States law.37
B. Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony in Civil Law Nations
Cambodian law has adopted a civil law tradition.38 Therefore, it is instructive to view the
admissibility of expert witnesses in other civil law nations, particularly in light of many civil law
nations’ propensity to allow the judges (as is the case in Cambodia) rather than the adverse
parties to appoint expert witnesses.
1. French Law Regarding the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Today, French law allows the appointment of an expert witness in three ways: 1) Any
party may request that the court appoint an expert to establish or preserve certain facts; 2) the
court may appoint an expert on its own volition; or 3) the judge may be required to appoint an
expert under statute.39 When an occasion arises where a party wishes to appoint an expert, both
sides submit motions and present an oral argument before the judge, who makes the ultimate
decision.40
In France, lists are maintained of both regional experts and national experts, with experts
maintaining a position on a regional list for three years prior to becoming eligible for a place on
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the national list.41 While the judges do not have to select experts from these lists, they are
precluded from selecting minors and individuals who are considered legally incompetent.42
Additionally, some professions require witnesses in that field to meet national standards in order
to qualify.43 These requirements, like those provided by the Daubert test and other requirements
found globally, test the reliability of the evidence. After the judge has selected an expert and
assigned a specific task for the expert, the parties can request a hearing to comment on the
expert’s task.44
There are three different types of expert testimony in France, the first being constatations
in which the witness provides answers to specific technical questions and is prohibited from
giving an opinion about the consequences of the finding.45 Another type of expert testimony is
the consultation, which is an opinion normally given orally that is more than simple fact-finding,
but not qualified as expertise under French law.46 The final variation of expert testimony is
expertise, which requires experts “to research and present an opinion on a particular issue.”47
2. Korean Law Regarding the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
In Korea, the law requires a judge to appoint an expert, stipulating that the appointed
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individual have the “erudition and/or experience necessary for giving expert testimony.”48 The
typical expert witness possesses “advanced scholarship in a particular field or discipline,” or
works in an occupation that requires certification or licensure.49 Individuals qualified to serve as
expert witnesses have been described “as either ‘men of letters’ or specialized professionals who
can serve as court assistants.”50 Korean law is very flexible as to the manner in which experts
are appointed, allowing either party to petition the court seeking the appointment of an expert.51
Additionally, the Court may ask the parties to select an expert from a list or unilaterally select an
individual to serve as an expert, should it decide that expertise is required.52 Pursuant to Korean
law, individuals who are qualified to give expert testimony before the court are required to do
so.53
Much like experts appointed pursuant to the ECCC’s Internal Rules, the Korean experts
are assigned a task by the court.54 Such an assignment can include the expert clarifying certain
facts involved in the case, or giving an opinion on an ultimate issue in the case.55 The expert
prepares a report for the court, which is then distributed to the parties (again very similar to the
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report requirement found in the ECCC’s Internal Rule 32).56 The report includes information
about the expert (such as qualifications to act as an expert), a summary of the task appointed,
lists of materials reviewed by the expert, and the expert’s analysis and conclusions based on the
information provided.57
3. Italian Law Regarding the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
When needed, a judge in Italy has the ability, as in the ECCC and Korea, to appoint an
expert who “must be impartial, and, subject to the rules of abstention and disqualification, which
are decided by the judge.”58 The judge is not bound to the expert’s findings, but must give
reasons for not following them should the judge choose not to.59 While the parties in Italy are
unable to appoint experts, each side has the right to appoint technical consultants, who also act as
experts in non-judicial fields.60
4. Japanese Law Regarding the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
In Japan, the primary purpose of the expert witness is to serve the court, although parties
can hire their own experts.61 However, experts are typically identified as being predisposed to
one side if hired by a party.62 In the past, Japanese courts took an approach similar to other civil

56

Id. at 94.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 83 n. 144.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Eric A. Feldman, Law, Society, and Medical Malpractice Litigation in Japan, 8 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 257, 270 (2009). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
62

Id.
22

law countries, allowing the judge to select an expert from a list provided by one of the parties
(although these lists were able to be challenged by the opposing party), or taking
recommendations for professional and academic organizations.63 However, Japan has introduced
a new form of expert different from those traditionally found in court systems. These experts are
actually a group of “expert commissioners” who can be called directly by the court to support
judges in “identifying and analyzing disputed issues, facilitating settlement, rendering opinions
on technical issues, and evaluating evidence, among other functions.”64
The Japanese system in general is much more similar to that of the United States than it is
to those of the ECCC or Korea, as it provides a more adversarial approach to appointing
witnesses. However, the group of “expert commissioners” resembles those systems found in
France, Italy, and Korea in allowing judges to select the experts, as well as seeing these experts
as serving the court rather than the litigants.
C. Challenges to Expert Testimony Under International Criminal Law
The ICTY has generally held that any evidence demonstrating relevance and probative
value should be deemed admissible, so long as there is no reason to question the evidence’s
reliability.65 International tribunals have held that initial challenges to expert testimony can open
if there is a question as to one of several different factors. One question is whether the subject
matter is in itself proper for expert testimony, or if it is a matter that is already within the
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“knowledge and experience of the court.”66 If the question is already within the purview of the
court’s knowledge and experience, then the evidence is inadmissible.67
Another question the court must ask is whether the evidence is relevant in assisting the
Trial Chambers in determining the matter at hand. The ICTY has held that it will not admit
expert “testimony it considers to be cumulative and/or irrelevant ....”68
The Court must also determine if the expert had the “necessary qualifications and
methods,” as witnesses lacking these qualifications cannot be considered “experts.”69 In The
Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., the Trial Chamber found that the Prosecution’s witness was not
qualified to testify as an expert on Rwandan constitutional law.70 The Court found that the
witness could not demonstrate any specialized education involving constitutional law, nor could
the witness show any consultancies dealing with the narrow constitutional issue involved in the
case.71 Additionally, the witness had been called upon to determine the constitutionality of
certain laws and decrees only approximately five times over a twenty year period, leaving the
Trial Chamber dissatisfied with the witness’ qualifications.72 This provides a more rigorous
standard than is found in England, which simply required that expert witnesses be “competent,”
66
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but it is difficult to determine if the standard is as rigorous as the Daubert standard, since the
Court has not definitively outlined in detail what is required to meet the “qualifications”
requirement.
Despite the Bizimungu decision, some courts have elected to admit evidence that might
come from unqualified experts, and then allow issues pertaining to the witness’ qualifications to
weigh against the relevancy of the testimony.73
The ICTR has also precluded expert testimony when it is introduced outside of the time
limitations outlined in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence when there is a lack of “need.”74 In
one such case, the court stated that by attempting to introduce the expert past the time
limitations, the Prosecutor must “demonstrate such need” and “relate the expert evidence to
specific evidence in the indictment,” effectively placing the burden on the introducing party to
show such requirements are met.75
Finally, the last question the ICTR and ICTY must examine is whether the expert is
independent.76 This issue will be discussed in Section IV.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF IN-HOUSE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND BIASED EXPERT
TESTIMONY AT INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Bias and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals
The ICTR and ICTY Trial Chambers are not bound to accept the evidence of any expert,
73
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as the Chambers may make its own decision whether to accept or reject various expert evidence
presented before it.77 Additionally, the ICTY has stated that “from the moment they make the
solemn declaration at the latest, the witnesses must no longer be considered witnesses of either of
the parties to the trial but only as witnesses of justice.”78 Because of this, experts have been
described as “servants of the court” each of whom, following the solemn declaration, becomes “a
witness of truth before the Tribunal and, inasmuch as he or she is required to contribute to the
establishment of truth, not strictly a witness for either party.”79 The experts are asked to
“provide impartial and neutral evidence to enhance the tribunal’s understanding of events.”80 The
Court has stated that, “[j]ust as for any other evidence presented, it is for the Trial Chamber to
assess the reliability and probative value of the expert report and testimony.”81
1. Impartiality of Witnesses Who Are Charged With Related Crimes
The ICTR examined the impartiality requirement in The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul

77

Id. at 203.

78

Prosecutor v. Jeslisic, IT-95-10-T, Decision on Communication Between Parties and
Witnesses, available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tdec/en/81211WG113147.htm.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17]. See also ICTY, Decision on
Communication Between Parties and Witnesses Judicial Supplement,
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp1-e/jelisic.htm (last visited
Oct. 31, 2009) (holding that “allowing the parties to communicate with witnesses regarding the
content of their testimony after the start of the testimony in Court might render questionable the
integrity of the testimony or the credibility of the witness,” and requiring opposing parties and
the Victims and Witnesses Unit be informed of any such communication with a witness).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
Melanie Klinkner, Proving Genocide? Forensic Expertise and the ICTY, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
447, 458 (2008). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
79

80

Id.

81

Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-AR73.2, Decision on Joint Defense Interlocutory
Appeal Concerning the Status of Richard Butler as an Expert Witness at ¶ 20 n. 79. [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
26

Akayesu, where the Chambers held that a witness must be “impartial” in order to qualify as an
expert witness.82 The Court held that, because the witness was being charged before the tribunal
for “crimes related to those [with] which Akayesu is charged,” the impartiality of the witness
could not be assured and thus the Chamber precluded the testimony.83 The Chamber also
pointed out the potential prejudice caused to the witness in compelling testimony before the very
Chamber where he was later to stand trial, creating a possibility that the witness’ fundamental
rights would be violated.84 While the court precluded testimony in this case, this seems to be an
extreme form of “bias,” as the “expert” was to come before the tribunal at a later time for related
crimes. Such bias not only favors one side, but creates a potential conflict of interest through the
witness hoping to protect his own interests.
2. Impartiality of Staff Member of the Office of the Prosecutor
The Court has also explicitly held that a certain staff member of the Office of the
Prosecutor was unable to qualify as an expert before the Chambers. In Prosecutor v. Milutinovic
et al., the Court stated that Philip Coo, witness for the Prosecution, was unable to qualify as a
witness given his extensive work with the Office of the Prosecutor.85 Mr. Coo had worked with
the Office of the Prosecutor since the beginning of the investigations being tried, providing the
82
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Office of the Prosecutor with advice on how to best form the case against the accused while also
advising them on the best methods for conducting interviews with the accused and military
personnel.86 Additionally, Mr. Coo’s “expert” report to the court included not just factual
information garnered from his investigation, but also opinions regarding Mr. Coo’s impressions
on how the facts related to the criminal culpability of the accused. 87 The Chambers found that
Mr. Coo could serve as a fact witness and present any results from the investigations he
conducted, but that his opinions should not be admitted.88 Because the limitation on testimony
allowed by Mr. Coo would not “significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the
proceeding or the outcome of the trial,” there were no grounds for appealing the decision.89 As
in Akayesu, this expert witness had many connections with one of the parties involved in the
case. The witness not only worked with the Office of the Prosecutor, but also helped develop the
prosecution’s strategy with reference to interviewing the accused and military personnel. This
inextricable connection between the witness and the prosecution led the court to prevent any
testimony dealing with the witness’ opinion from being admitted into court. But even with these
close ties the witness was allowed to testify with regard to facts the witness had personally
investigated.
In a different ICTY proceeding, the Judge stated to the expert witness that “you are under
oath now, and -- but you are a staff member of the OTP. Obviously you can continue working at
86
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the OTP, but you are absolutely not allowed to speak to anyone about your current testimony. ...
So you're not to mention your testimony to anyone.”90 At the hearing, the Prosecutor informed
the Judge that the expert witness would not be returning to work while the testimony was
ongoing, and that the Prosecutor had prohibited the witness’ contact with any other members of
the Office of the Prosecution, which the Judge stated to be a “better” solution.91 The judge in
this case was most concerned with preventing any impropriety through one side’s influencing the
testimony of the expert; but the judge did not believe that the witness’ working relationship with
the Office of the Prosecutor created an insurmountable bias or conflict that would preclude the
testimony.
In still another ICTY case, a defendant contested the admission of expert testimony
partially on the grounds that the witness “might not objective, as he worked for the Prosecution
as an ‘in-house expert.’”92 The Trial Chamber rejected this argument, stating that the fact an
expert witness works for the Office of the Prosecutor does not mean that the witness must lack
objectivity.93 The Trial Chamber elected to take into account the expert witness’ work with the
Prosecution in determining what weight to grant the testimony, rather than ruling the testimony
inadmissible as a result of the relationship.94
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The ICTY generally has allowed testimony of staff members of the Office of the
Prosecution. With the exception of the Milutinovic case, the Chambers have allowed such staff
to be admitted as expert witnesses. In Milutinovic, as in Akayesu, the link to one party was so
inextricable as to render the testimony inherently biased and partial. Yet in Milutinovic, while
the Court would not allow the witness to be admitted as an expert, it did allow the witness to
testify as a fact witness with regard to the investigation the witness personally conducted. The
key to the determination of admissibility of staff members of each party as expert witnesses
before the international tribunals seems to be how involved the staff member was with
developing the actual case. If a staff member did not work on the strategy of the case, for
example, it is likely that the Court would hold that person’s testimony admissible as expert
testimony.
3. Impartiality of Expert Witnesses Who Receive Payment for Their
Testimony Before the Court
The courts have generally not considered the payment of witnesses as compromising to
the impartiality or integrity of the witnesses.95 The ECCC Internal Rule 31 provides “monetary
compensation to any experts appointed by the Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers,” with
rates established by the Office of Administration.96 The Special Court for Sierra Leone has
adopted a comprehensive set of guidelines governing what expenses the Court can compensate,
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as well as what other provisions can be made to experts (such as meals and accommodations).97
B. Role of Impartiality and Bias of Expert Witnesses in International Law
1. Impartiality and Bias in United States Law
In the United States, it has been held that expert testimony should not be ruled
inadmissible solely because the expert may be biased. In one Fifth Circuit case, an expert
witness’ “expertise and impartiality were vigorously attacked, but the degree to which his
testimony was thus impugned was for the jury to evaluate.”98 The Second Circuit has further
stressed that it is the province of the jury to determine the credibility of any witness.99 The Court
determined that the expert’s testimony turned on credibility issues, as a study of the testimony
indicated it was “open and fair,” with no evidence that would lead the Court to believe the expert
would neglect to give an honest opinion.100 These circuits indicate a willingness to allow any
testimony as expert testimony, so long as it conforms to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because
the jury is the proper determiner of a witness’ credibility, the Courts seem unwilling to overturn
such a determination by the jury absent strong evidence that the expert testimony was not “open
and fair.”
As stated previously, judges in the United States have the power to appoint their own
experts in addition to the experts brought in by the adverse parties. While this option may seem
97
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less inherently biased, there is still great opportunity for bias to surface in any expert testimony
given by expert witnesses appointed by a judge.101 Given the Gideon and Scott decisions, the
Court would likely relate any questions of bias regarding these witnesses back to the jury for
proper weighing with the facts of the case, as such questions would deal with the witnesses’
credibility.
2. Impartiality and Bias in German Law
Under German law, the Bundesgerichtshof (federal court of justice) has stated that the
Court has a duty to examine the language of the opinion given by expert witnesses.102 In looking
at the language, the court can search for “bias or a lack of impartiality on the part of the expert
witness.”103 German law requires that “fresh, independent and objective expert opinion must be
obtained” if any indication of bias is found.104 This is due in part to “the duty of judges to
control the reliability and verifiability of opinions of experts.”105 An example of such bias in the
case the Bundesgerichtshof was hearing involved the use of pejorative terms by the expert
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witness when referring to the defendant in the case.106 This is much different from the rulings in
the United States, where the courts have emphasized that it is the place of the jury to determine
the bias, and subsequent credibility, of witnesses.107 While the United States would allow the
court to rule on the inadmissibility of expert testimony because of bias in extreme situations
(where the testimony would not be “open and fair”), the German court stresses that the judges
have a duty to ensure there is no indication of bias. This standard allows the courts much more
latitude in controlling the testimony of individuals that may be biased when attempting to testify
as expert witnesses.
3. Impartiality and Bias in English Law
English law allows an examination of expert witness’ objectivity in determining whether
evidence should be admissible. In Preece v. HM Advocate, Preece was convicted of murder
following testimony by the prosecution’s expert that seminal stains on the murder victim’s pants
were of the same blood group as the defendant.108 The expert, however, neglected to inform the
court that the victim also had blood from the same blood group, which would have given
credence to the argument that the stains were actually from the victim’s own blood.109
Additionally, the Court found that the prosecution’s expert utilized a scientific method for
examining the secretions that was not recognized in scientific journals, casting more doubt on the
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expert’s testimony.110 As a result, the Court held that the expert witness had not acted
objectively, and overturned the original conviction.111 Following cases similar to Preece that
demonstrated problems with England’s expert witness rules, a commission indicated that
examination of expert witnesses is often exploited “in such a way as to give to the evidence a
slant that is neither objective nor scientific. All too often, expert evidence is given orally by
witnesses in order, it would seem, to enhance the value of the evidence in the eyes of the
jury.”112
The British approach, much like that of the United States (which also practices common
law), allows the court to intervene if an expert obviously lacks objectivity. However, as has been
discussed previously, the British state that the weight afforded the evidence is to be determined
by the “tribunal of fact.”113 It seems that the British approach is much like the United States’,
prohibiting the testimony if it is so biased that it is not “open and fair,” but generally allowing
the testimony and letting the tribunal of fact determine the proper weight that the evidence
should be afforded.
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working in a laboratory, approaching his task with cold neutrality, and dedicated only to the
pursuit of scientific truth. It is a sombre thought that the reality is sometimes different. Forensic
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4. Impartiality and Bias in Korean Law
Under Korean law, the courts have the freedom to accept and reject portions of expert
testimony at the court’s discretion.114 Additionally, such experts are assistants to the court and
are not afforded an “aura of infallibility.”115 Not only can a judge elect which portions of the
testimony to accept (if any at all), but the judge can also question the expert on the report, as well
as request another expert opinion.116 As in the common-law nations, Korean judges can
determine what weight to grant the expert opinion, but they also are allowed this extra latitude in
seeking further information if they deem it necessary.
Litigants in the case are able to challenge the appointment of experts.117 Korean law
establishes a vague standard for challenging such experts, stating: “In cases where there are such
circumstances as preventing an expert witness from giving expert testimony faithfully, the
parties may challenge him.”118 Such challenges are often made by parties alleging that an expert
is biased or has an interest in the outcome of the case.119 The laws of Korea allow a denial of a
challenge to be immediately appealed, rather than requiring the parties to wait until after the
trial’s conclusion.120 Again, Korean law provides for a vague standard in challenging an expert,
and does not speak directly to a prohibition on expert testimony based on a bias. This vague
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standard seems to follow the standard outlined by the courts in the United States and England,
which provide for the rejection of expert testimony that crosses the line so much that it is no
longer “open and fair,” although the rule as written seems to require the judge to examine each
challenge based on the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
5. Impartiality and Bias in French Law
Following the appointment of an expert by the French court, litigants can object to the
appointment, alleging prejudice, bias, or conflict of interest with a timely-filed motion to
recuse.121 When a motion to recuse is not filed in a timely manner, the court is free to consider
the information provided by the expert in determining the probative value of the expert’s report
to the court.122 In cases where an expert realizes that the facts would preclude him/her from
making an impartial analysis and testimony, the expert is required to withdraw as a witness and
the court is then able to appoint a different expert.123 This procedure is different from that in
countries with an adversarial system, as those countries allow testimony from such witnesses and
exclude their testimony only in cases where the witness demonstrates an extreme bias.
Because experts under French law are considered officers of the Court, they are not
allowed to accept “money, gifts, food, or any type of benefit from the parties.”124 Additionally,
French experts must keep confidential any information gained during their service with the court,
and are prohibited from granting interviews relating information about the expert’s court-
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assigned mission.125
V. CONCLUSION
As has been previously discussed126, the Internal Rules of the ECCC do not discuss the
qualifications required for an expert witness to testify before the Chambers, nor does it discuss
any requirements of impartiality on the part of the witness. Common law nations have varied
requirements for expert witnesses. England requires that experts, at the least, be “competent,”
while the United States has the comprehensive Daubert test that requires judges to weigh several
factors in coming to a decision. While the United States’ Federal Rules of Evidence allows for
judges to appoint experts, the U.S. courts generally waive that right and hear experts presented
by the parties. Civil law nations follow contrasting procedures, as they typically allow the
judges to select the experts, often incorporating lists of experts for the courts to utilize, or
requiring experts to maintain licensure or certification in certain fields. International criminal
tribunals observe four factors in determining if a witness can qualify as an expert: 1) Whether the
subject matter is in itself proper for expert testimony, or if it is a matter that is already within the
“knowledge and experience of the court;” 2) whether the evidence is relevant in assisting the
Trial Chambers in determining the matter at hand; 3) if the expert had the “necessary
qualifications and methods;” and 4) whether the expert is independent. All four of these factors
are similar to requirements of other courts, and should prove instructive to the ECCC.
While international tribunals have precluded expert testimony from witnesses who are
inextricably linked to procedures of the court (such as a defendant in a related incident, or an
individual who worked for years with and advised the prosecution), the tribunals have generally
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allowed expert testimony of in-house experts. As long as these expert witnesses do not work
closely with the prosecution or defense during the time that they are testifying, the court has
traditionally found no conflict.
Common law countries, such as the United States and England, allow the court to
intervene in instances of overt bias by an expert witness. However, these countries typically
leave such questions of bias for the trier of fact to weigh when considering the evidence. Civil
law countries, which typically require judges to work more closely with the witnesses (as is the
case with the ECCC), require the courts to exercise firmer control in excluding biased witnesses.
In France, experts are required to recuse themselves if they feel they are not able to demonstrate
impartiality. The German courts also require experts to be dismissed if they demonstrate a bias
and for new experts to be appointed in their stead, while Korean law allows judges to challenge
expert testimony and seek additional information (in addition to challenges made by the parties
involved in the case). These approaches are most instructive in regards to the ECCC, given the
ECCC’s role in assigning judges specific assignments. The judges in the ECCC should be given
the same discretion for removing expert witnesses as the international courts that exercise similar
systems are allowed.
ECCC staff would likely qualify as an expert witness before the tribunal so long as the
expert meets the ICTY and ICTR requirements that the expert the expert have the “necessary
qualifications and methods” and act independently. As to whether the expert is independent, the
ECCC will likely examine the facts of the case at hand and compare them with those of the
Milutinovic case. The key to the determination of admissibility of staff members of each party as
expert witnesses before the international tribunals seems to be how involved the staff member
was with developing the actual case. If a staff member did not work on the actual strategy of the
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case, this would seem to improve the likelihood that such a witness would be considered
independent to the ECCC.

39

